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Abstract
We study a system in which N agents have to decide between two strategies θi (i ∈
1 . . . N), for defection or cooperation, when interacting with other n agents (either spatial
neighbors or randomly chosen ones). After each round, they update their strategy responding
nonlinearly to two different information sources: (i) the payoff ai(θi, fi) received from the
strategic interaction with their n counterparts, (ii) the fraction fi of cooperators in this
interaction. For the latter response, we assume social herding, i.e. agents adopt their strategy
based on the frequencies of the different strategies in their neighborhood, without taking into
account the consequences of this decision. We note that fi already determines the payoff,
so there is no additional information assumed. A parameter ζ defines to what level agents
take the two different information sources into account. For the strategic interaction, we
assume a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, i.e. one in which defection is the evolutionary stable
strategy. However, if the additional dimension of social herding is taken into account, we
find instead a stable outcome where cooperators are the majority. By means of agent-based
computer simulations and analytical investigations, we evaluate the critical conditions for
this transition towards cooperation. We find that, in addition to a high degree of social
herding, there has to be a nonlinear response to the fraction of cooperators. We argue that
the transition to cooperation in our model is based on less information, i.e. on agents which
are not informed about the payoff matrix, and therefore rely on just observing the strategy
of others, to adopt it. By designing the right mechanisms to respond to this information, the
transition to cooperation can be remarkably enhanced.
Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma, social influence, mechanism design, nonlinear voter
model
1 Introduction
Cooperation is an abundant phenomenon in biological and social systems, but in most game-
theoretical approaches defection should be the rational strategy to choose. In order to solve this
paradox, a vast number of literature has proposed modifications to the classical approach. They
can be categorized along different directions:
• changes of the payoff structure: lowering the costs of cooperation to make it more attractive
in the first place is another form of "buying cooperation",
∗ Corresponding author: fschweitzer@ethz.ch
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• extension of the time horizon: considering either repeated interaction, a memory for the
strategy of the couterparts, calculating payoffs over a longer time interval, anticipating the
future response to the own action,
• considering spatial interaction: the threshold for the outbreak of cooperation is lowered if
agents’ interaction is constrained to their nearest or second-nearest neighbors (as opposed
to randomly chosen agents), or if agents can migrate between different spatial domains
We note that, particularly for biological systems, other additional mechanisms have been con-
sidered [15], such as altruism, the role of kinship relations, selection mechanisms on the group
level, etc.
In this paper, we add a new element to the discussion: social herding, i.e. a mechanism that
does not take strategic considerations into account. Agents can observe the actions of others
without knowing their consequence. In a game-theoretical setting this means they cannot adopt
a certain strategy based on payoff considerations because the payoff structure is not known to
them. Thus, agents are just left with knowing the frequency of strategies either globally or in
their neighborhood, and they choose their own strategy only based on the information about
the frequency of these strategies. In our model, we assume that any agent can consider both the
payoff-related and the frequency-related information and weight their influence by a parameter ζ,
which is assumed to be the level of social herding. Precisely, ζ → 0 results in purely payoff-driven
decisions, ζ → 1 in pure social herding.
The case where social herding is dominant has been widely studied in binary opinion dynamics
models [5, 21, 23, 29] where opinions are not necessarily related to payoff but rather to social
norms. Thus, agents may adopt the opinion of a majority in order to minimize social conflicts,
but they may not have a utility-based preference for either of these opinions. Instead their
opinion results from a frequency-dependent decision. The so called linear voter model, where
the probability to choose a particular opinion is directly proportional to its frequency is a very
common example for this. It is known to result in consensus, i.e. the existence of only one opinion,
asymptotically, but the outcome which opinion will dominate is not determined. In the mean-
field limit, this model always results in consensus of either of the two opinions. Starting e.g. with
the frequency f1 of opinions θ = 1 and f0 = 1 − f1 with θ = 0,the probability that the final
consensus state is θi = 1 for all i is f1 [10]. Hence, a simple majority rule of social herding, as
expressed in the linear voter model, may not improve the situation for cooperation. Therefore,
we turn to the class of nonlinear voter models [18] in Sect. 2. As we will also show analytically
in Sect. 3, a nonlinear social herding by itself will not lead to a transition towards cooperation.
Instead, it is needed the right level of social herding in combination with the right nonlinearity,
to enhance cooperation.
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What do we gain from such insights? First of all, a better understanding of the fact that more
information does not necessarily lead to a better outcome (in this case, to cooperation). Common
wisdom would suggest that it is always better to have more information, e.g. to choose among
more alternatives, to determine their consequences in advance, and thus to reduce the risk asso-
ciated with making the wrong decision. What seems to be an optimal strategy on the individual
level, turns out to lead to the lock-in into unfavorable situations on the global level. For exam-
ple, in experiments on the wisdom of crowd effect, it was shown that more information about
the guesses of other agents, combined with social influence, leads to a failure in the predictions
[13]. Also, in a network formation model of agents sharing knowledge it was shown that best
response, i.e. the choice of partners based on knowing all alternatives, resulted in a worse global
performance as compared to a situation where just the next best partner was accepted [12]. As
we point out with this work, to leave the trap of defection also crucially depends on using less
of the available information, or to have a considerable fraction of less informed agents.
Second, from our insights we can derive mechanisms to improve the outcome in systems of strate-
gically interacting agents. Mechanism design can be seen as the engineering part of economics.
It allows to propose rules, or algorithms, for interactions that avoid the system getting trapped
in suboptimal states. Some of these algorithms, such as the nowadays famous “Gale-Shapley"
algorithm [7], are basically related to combinatorial optimization problems. I.e., they propose a
solution for the agents without involving the agents in finding it, themselves. Systems design,
the way we see it, aims instead at proposing new ways of interaction at the agent level, in order
to arrive at more favorable solutions at the system’s level. Our paper gives a lucid example of
this kind of systems design, by proposing a different way of combining information an individual
agent already has. This still leaves room for the forces of self-organization to act, but restricts
the possible negative outcome.
2 Basic Model
2.1 Combining social herding and strategic interaction
We consider a system with N agents. Each agent i ∈ 1 . . . N is characterized by two individual
variables which may change over time: θi(t) shall describe the agent’s strategic behavior when
interacting with other agents, whereas ζi(t) shall describe how much the agent is prone to social
influence. We adopt the definition of social influence as the psychological tendency of individuals
to adhere to and behave according to the expectations of its local neighborhood [11]. In this
sense, our approach belongs to a wider class of models which do not restrict herding behavior to
perfectly rational agents [16].
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In an economic context, θi refers to the strategy of a utility maximizing agent, chosen from a
(discrete) set σ of possible strategies. We use the standard game theoretical setting of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game, i.e. σ ∈ {0, 1}, where the strategic behavior σ = 0 refers to defection (D)
and σ = 1 to cooperation (C).
We assume that each agent plays a 2-person (non-iterated) game with n other agents which are
located in its neighborhood. The completion of these n games is called a round. From each of
these interactions the agent receives a payoff which depends both on the strategic behavior of the
agent itself and on the opponents’. The game structure describing a single interaction between
two agents can be summarized by the standard payoff matrix of a 2-person game:
θj = 1 θj = 0
θi = 1 R/R S/T
θi = 0 T/S P/P
Suppose, agent i has chosen to cooperate, then its payoff is R if the other agent j has also chosen
to cooperate (without knowing about the decision of agent i), but S if agent j defects. On the
other hand, if agent i has chosen to defect, then it will receive the payoff T if agent j cooperates,
while it will receive P if agent j defects.
In this paper, we will restrict the discussion to the PD game, but we note that our investigations
can be extended to other games that result from different values of R, S, T and P [20]. For the
particular case of the PD game, the payoffs have to fulfill the following two inequalities:
T > R > P > S ; 2R > S + T (1)
The known standard values are T = 5, R = 3, P = 1, S = 0. This implies that, in a so-called
one-shot game (no repeated interaction), defection σ = 0, is the rational strategy because it
rewards the higher payoff for an agent i no matter whether the opponent chooses C or D. As
this argument applies to both agents, one can expect that on the system level a global defective
behavior emerges. Because of this, the PD game has become a paradigmatic model to study
different mechanisms of transition towards a global cooperative behavior [1, 26], a question that
has puzzled the scientific community for decades.
Let us define the degree of cooperation on the system’s level by the total number of cooperating
agents, N1(t) relative to the total population N . Since the number of agents is constant, the
global frequencies fσ of cooperating and defecting agents are given by
N =
∑
σ
Nσ = N0 +N1 = const. ; σ ∈ {0, 1},
fσ =
Nσ
N
; f ≡ f1 = 1− f0. (2)
In the following, the variable f shall refer to the global frequency of cooperators.
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The interaction of each agent with n other agents in a 2-person game results in
(
N
n
)
different
possibilities to choose a partner. As the result of these interactions that may occur independently,
but simultaneously [8, 20], agent i receives a total payoff Ai(θi) which depends both on its own
strategy θi and the strategies of the n different partners. Let us assume that n0 of these partners
have chosen to defect, whereas n1 = n − n0 partners have chosen to cooperate. Then the total
payoff from these n interactions reads:
Ai(θi) = δ1,θi
[
n1R+ n0 S
]
+ δ0,θi
[
n1 T + n0 P
]
, (3)
where δx,y means the Kronecker delta, which is 1 only for x = y and zero otherwise. Dividing by
n gives the scaled total payoff:
ai(θi, fi) =
Ai(θi)
n
= δ1,θi
[
fiR+ (1− fi)S
]
+ δ0,θi
[
fi T + (1− fi)P
]
, (4)
where fi = n1/n = 1 − n0/n gives the fraction of cooperating agents agent i interacts with.
Assuming e.g. that agent i interacts with its neigbors, fi gives the local frequency of cooperators.
If on the other hand agent i interacts with n randomly chosen agents, the probability to choose a
cooperator is directly proportional to the global fraction f . I.e. in the so-call mean-field approach
we set fi ≡ f .
Strategic considerations imply that agent i pays attention to the scaled payoff ai(θi, fi) expected
from the interaction with fi cooperators, which of course also depends on its own strategy θi.
A nonlinear function G(ai) shall consider the way agent i combines the information about the
different payoffs ai(θi, fi) and ai(1− θi, fi) resulting from its possible strategic choice. This shall
used below to define the transition rate for an agent to change between strategies, therefore we
conveniently normalize G(ai) to one. In a very general way, we assume:
G(ai) = exp [βi ai(θi, fi)]
exp [βi ai(θi, fi)] + exp [βi ai(1−θi, fi)] . (5)
Eq. (5) has the form of a logit-function well established in decision theory [4, 14, 30]. The param-
eter βi allows agents to individually weight differences between the payoffs. βi → 0 represents
the limit of random choice between strategies, G(ai) → 1/2, whereas βi → ∞ means that even
small differences in payoff lead to an immediate switch between G(ai) = 0 and G(ai) = 1. For
small values of βi, the G(ai) tends to one if the expected payoff times the ai(θi, fi) from stategy
θi is much larger than the expected payoff ai(1 − θi, fi) from the opposite strategy 1 − θi. and
it tends to zero in the opposite case. If both payoffs become comparable, G(ai) is about 1/2.
Intermediate values of βi allow for a smooth transition between the two strategic cases.
We note that for sufficiently small values of βi Eq. (5) can be approximated by the linear function
G(ai) ≈ 1
2
[
1 +
βi
2
{
ai(θi, fi)− ai(1−θi, fi)
}]
, (6)
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i.e. agents pay attention to the difference between the two possible payoffs.
The situation becomes different if the agent is unable to calculate the expected payoff. In our
model, we assume that the agent then rather pays attention to the action of the majority and
tends to imitate this without knowing about the consequences. Thus, agent i only responds to
the information associated with the frequency which shall be described by a logit-function similar
to Eq. (5):
F(fθi) =
exp [2βiκi(fθi) fθi−1]
exp [2βiκi(fθi) fθi−1] + exp (−[2βiκi(fθi) fθi−1])
. (7)
fθi describes the local frequency of agents playing strategy θi in the neighborhood of agent i, and
f1−θi = 1−fθi is the local frequency of agents playing the opposite strategy. Both frequencies be-
ing equal, F(fθi) = F(f1−θi) = 1/2. Again, for sufficiently small βi, from a linear approximation
in Eq. (7) we find,
F(fθi) ≈ βiκi(fθi) fθi . (8)
κi(fθi) is a nonlinear response function to consider a weighted influence of the frequency [18]
as we will investigate below. κi(fθi) may also depend on the time an agent has kept its current
strategy, or opinion [24, 25]. We emphasize that for the so-called linear voter model, κi(fθi) is
simply a constant κ that does not depend on the frequency. So βiκ can be scaled to one, which
means that for the linear voter model we simply arrive at F(fθi) = fθi . Thus, the response of
agent i is directly proportional to the local frequency of agents playing strategy θi.
After having defined the agent’s response to strategic information and to social herding, we use
the individual parameter ζi to weight these two different influences. Specifically, we define the
transition rate for agent i to switch from strategy (1−θi) to the opposite strategy θi as follows:
w(θi|(1−θi), fi, ζi) = (1− ζi)G(ai) + ζiF(fθi). (9)
For ζi → 0, we cover the limit case of strategic interaction in PD game, for ζi → 1, we arrive
at the limit case of pure social herding, i.e. imitation behavior without calculating the resulting
consequences.
2.2 Specifying the transition rates
Before describing the system’s dynamics by means of a master equation in the following section,
it will be handy to write down the transition rates of Eq. (9) more specifically. The transition
rates apply for a frequency dependent process, i.e. they do not depend on the specific sequence of
interaction. In this paper, we fix the number of independent, but simultaneous 2-person games to
n = 4, which is convenient to compare random interactions with local ones on a regular lattice.
Hence, the relevant frequencies have only discrete values fi ≡ ki/n where ki ≡ n1 = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 is
the actual number of cooperating agents, agent i is interacting with. On the other hand, random
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interactions can be approximated by the so-called mean field approximation, where fi = f , the
global fraction of cooperators.
Dropping the individual index i for the moment, we have to distinguish between two different
transition rates, ck(ζ) = w(1|0, k, ζ), i.e. the transition from defection to cooperation dependent
on k cooperating agents, and dk(ζ) = w(0|1, k, ζ), i.e. the transition from cooperation to defection
under the same conditions. Both of these rates are comprised of two parts, one resulting from
strategic behavior (c˜k, d˜k), the other one resulting from social herding (cˆk, dˆk),
ck(ζ) = (1− ζ)c˜k + ζcˆk ; dk(ζ) = (1− ζ)d˜k + ζdˆk. (10)
For the terms (cˆk, dˆk) related to social herding, we use the linear approximation, Eq. (8), i.e. for
the specified neighborhood n = 4,
cˆk =
k
4
βκk ; dˆk = 1− n− k
4
βκk. (11)
Again, for the linear voter model with κk ≡ κ and the (cˆk, dˆk) would simply result from the set
of values {0, 1/4, 2/4, 3/4, 1}. In order to use nonlinearities in the frequency response, we rather
prefer to specify the (cˆk, dˆk) by discrete values α0, α1, α2 as shown in Table (12)
f = k/n c˜k d˜k cˆk dˆk
0 c˜0 d˜0 α0 1−α0
1/4 c˜1 d˜1 α1 1−α1
2/4 c˜2 d˜2 α2 α2
3/4 c˜3 d˜3 1−α1 α1
1 c˜4 d˜4 1−α0 α0
(12)
The parameter α0 describes the transition of a cooperator (defector) towards defection (coopera-
tion) if surrounded by cooperators (defectors) solely based on social herding. Because agents with
such strategies to follow are absent in the neighborhood, α0 should be consequently zero, even
if there is a strong strategic incentive for a cooperator to switch towards defection if surrounded
by cooperators. Hence, considering only social herding, pure cooperation and pure defection are
“absorbing" states for the dynamics of the system. This can be avoided by choosing α0 = ε,
a very small value that allows for occasional random changes of the strategies [18], but in this
paper we choose α0 = 0.
Possible combinations of (α1, α2) define a parameter space to distinguish between different forms
of social herding, as shown in Fig. 1 (left). Positive frequency dependence (pf) means that the
probability to change to the opposite strategy monotonously increases with the frequency of that
strategy in the neighborhood, also known as “majority voting”. Negative frequency dependence
(nf) means the opposite, i.e. the probability monotonously decreases with the frequency, also
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known as “minority voting”. On the other hand, (pa) and (na) define parameter regions with
non-monotonous dependence. For example, (pa) means an increase of the probability as long
as the opposite stragety is not the majority, also known as voting against the trend, while
(na) describes constellations with a strong amplification of minority strategies. We note that
the so-called “voter point” that represents the the linear voter model –where α1 = 1/4 and
α2 = 2α1 = 1/2 are strictly proportional to k– is on the border between the (pf) and (pa)
parameter regions. For our investigations, we will consider a scenario where the nonlinearity is
only represented by α2, whereas α1 is chosen according to the linear voter model. Four possible
cases which refer to the (pf), (pa), (na) and the linear voter model are shown in Fig. 1 (right)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
f
κ
Figure 1: (left) Parameter space (α1, α2) to define the nonlinearity in social herding (see also
Table 12). The different regions are explained in the text. We use the (pa) region, defined by
Eq. (18). (right) Linear voter model (red line) and deviations controlled by α2 at f = 0.5.
It remains to specify the payoff related terms (c˜k, d˜k) which follow directly from Eq. (5). Here,
we assume the deterministic limit βi → 0, for which we get G(ai) = Θ
[
ai(θi, fi)− ai(1−θi, fi)
]
,
where Θ[y] is the Heavyside function, which is one if y > 0 and zero otherwise. I.e. G(ai) is
either one or zero dependent on whether the payoff for the changed strategy is larger or less
than the payoff resulting from the current strategy. Taking into account the payoff relations,
Eq. (1), we verify that the expected payoffs, Eq. (4), for defectors, a(0, f), are always larger
than the corresponding ones for cooperators, a(1, f), regardless of the fraction of cooperators in
the neighborhood. I.e. in non-repeated games as considered here, defection is an evolutionary
stable strategy. Hence, in the deterministic limit of stategic interaction, we have always c˜k = 0
and d˜k = 1. This can be rightly assumed as the worst-case scenario because, considering only
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a strategic point of view, the system will always end up in pure defection. The most important
thing is to identify conditions where an additional social herding allows not only to avoid this
trap, but also to let the dynamics to converge to pure cooperation.
The observant reader may have noticed that we have interpreted βi differently for social herding
(where we assumed that it is just small) and for strategic interaction (where β → 0 was assumed).
This is not a contradiction. In fact, β quantifies the randomness in following the different infor-
mation, and we can assume that the payoff related attention is much higher and less prone to
errors than the response to the behavior of neighbors. In general, we may distinguish between β˜i
and βˆi for the different responses, but this is not applied here.
2.3 Dynamics to change the strategy
In the previous section, we have defined the “rules” for agents to change their strategy dependent
on both strategic information and social herding. Most agent-based models, at this point, would
continue with extensive computer simulations to probe the parameter space for some non-trivial
results. We will certainly follow with computer simulations as well, however we are also interested
in some analytical insights into the model which would allow us to predict the system’s dynamics
without testing every possible parameter combination. For this reason, we need to specify the
dynamics of agents in a more formal way, on two different levels, (a) on the micro level of the
individual agent, and (b) on the macro level, describing the fraction of cooperators in the system.
For the micro level, we use a stochastic approach, i.e. we deal with the probability pi(θi, t) that
agent i uses strategy θi at time t. As explained before, this probability depends on the strategies
of agents in the neighborhood of agent i expressed by the vector θi = {θi1 , θi2 , . . . , θin}. Hence,
pi(θi, t) is defined as the marginal distribution:
pi(θi, t) =
∑
θ′i
p(θi, θ
′
i, t). (13)
The summation is over all possible distributions θ′i. Specific realizations of these distributions
shall be denoted as σ. For n = 4, there are 2n possible realizations. For the time-dependent
change of pi(θi, t) we assume the following master equation:
d
dt
pi(θi, t) =
∑
θ′i
[
w(θi|(1−θi), θ′i) p(1−θi, θ′i, t)− w(1−θi|θi, θ′i) p(θi, θ′i, t)
]
. (14)
This equation considers all possible processes that may lead to an increase or decrease in the
probability that agent i uses strategy θi given the neigborhood distribution θi, with the transition
rates w(θi|(1−θi), θ′i), w(1−θi|θi, θi). Note that these are not the transition rates defined in Eq.
(9), which only depend on the local frequency fi, but not on the neighborhood distribution θi.
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In order to map the two, we have to consider how many specific realizations of the distribution
θi may lead to the same fi. Taking the example σ = {0010}, there are exactly
(
4
1
)
different
possibilities to realize fi = 1/n. Hence, transforming the master Eq. (14) that depends on the
neighborhood distribution θi into one that only contains the respective local frequency fi results
in a combinatorial prefactor of
(
n
k
)
. Using again the specific notations ck, dk, Eq. (10) for the
transition rates, we can rewrite the master equation (14) now as
d
dt
pi(1, ζ, t) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)[
ck(ζ) p(0, k/n, ζ, t)− dk(ζ) p(1, k/n, ζ, t)
]
. (15)
The corresponding master equation for pi(0, ζ, t) = 1 − pi(1, ζ, t) follows likewise. Note that in
Eq. (15) we have chosen the individual parameter ζi to be a constant ζ. I.e. whereas the local
frequency fi = k/n changes over time because of concurrent decisions of neighboring agents
about their strategies, ζ is, in this paper, assumed to be a global control parameter the impact
of which will be discussed together with the computer simulations.
With this, we have a bottom-up description of the system’s dynamics given by N stochastic
equations, Eq. (15), which are coupled because of the overlapping neighborhoods of agents,
expressed in terms of fi. On the other hand, on the macroscopic level we have to deal with the
probability P (f, ζ, t) to find a given fraction of cooperators, f , at time t, assuming the social
herding factor ζ. The dynamics can again be specified by a stochastic equation:
d
dt
P (f, ζ, t) =
∑
f ′
[
W (f |f ′, ζ) P (f ′, ζ, t)−W (f ′|f, ζ) P (f, ζ, t)
]
. (16)
f ′ denotes all possible deviations from a given value f that can be reached during one time step
by means of the transition ratesW (f ′|f, ζ). These are not identical with the individual transition
rates, Eq. (9), but aggregated rates that take into account all possible ways to change f . The
smallest change of f ≡ N1/N , Eq. (2), is the addition or substraction of a single cooperator,
i.e. f ′ ∈ {(N1 + 1)/N ; (N1 − 1)/N}. The individual equivalent for such processes is given by
Eq. (10), where the terms ck(ζ) describe the transition of a single defector into a cooperator, and
the dk(ζ) the opposite transition. Hence, we find for the aggregated transition rates
W (f + 1/N |f, ζ) ≡ W+(f, ζ) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
fk(1− f)n−k ck(ζ)
W (f − 1/N |f, ζ) ≡ W−(f, ζ) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
fn−k(1− f)k dn−k(ζ). (17)
The combinatorial prefactors preceeding the ck(ζ) and dk(ζ) result from the various ways to
choose agents with n = 4 neighbors, k of which could be cooperators given the gobal fraction
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of cooperators f . Here, we have used the so-called mean-field assumption that replaces the
frequencies fi of the individual neigborhoods by the global value f . With the specific values for
ck(ζ) and dk(ζ) given by Eqs. (10) and (12), the dynamics on the systemic level is also completely
specified. In the following, we will use the dynamics on the micro level for carrying out computer
simulations, while the dynamics on the macro level will be used for analytical investigations.
3 Results of Computer Simulations
We now use the dynamics specified in Eq. (15) to run agent-based computer simulations for
different sets of parameters. According to Eqs. (10), (12), we only need to vary the weight
0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1 and the parameters 0 ≤ (α1, α2) ≤ 1 assigned to the social herding of the agents.
Regarding their strategic decision, everything is already defined, and with c˜k = 0, d˜k = 1
defection remains the only choice. This “worst case scenario” can be only changed because of
a considerable amount of social herding, in which agents copy the strategy of their neighbors
regardless of the payoff assigned to it. This is shown in Fig. 2. Below a critical level for social
herding, ζ ≈ 0.7, only defection remains. For ζ > 0.7 we observe different levels of cooperation
which depend on the combination of ζ and α2. If ζ > 0.8, cooperation even becomes the majority,
i.e. f > 0.5, but only for large values of ζ and α2 full cooperation, f → 1, is reached. This issue
is further investigated below.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
ζ
f
0.4
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Figure 2: Global fraction of cooperation f dependent on the level of social herding ζ. α1 = 0.25
is fixed, α2 varies between 0.4 and 1.0 according to the color scale. System size N=400.
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The role of the nonlinearity in social herding, expressed in terms of α1, α2, is further investigated
in Fig. 3, given a supercritical level of social herding. We see that there is an optimal nonlinearity
to enhance cooperation, i.e. α1, α2 have to be chosen such that they belong to the area of “positive
allee” (pa) effects. This area is defined by the inequalities (see also Eq. (12)),
0 ≤ α1 ≤ α2; (1− α1) ≤ α2 ≤ 1. (18)
It describes a response where the transition toward a given strategy increases with the frequency
of that strategy as long as that strategy is not the majority, i.e. minority strategies are favored. A
special case where α1 is taken from the linear voter model, whereas α2 is larger than 0.5 is shown
in Fig. 1 (right). We note in particular that social herding according to the linear voter model will
not allow the transition toward cooperation, which will be further substantiated by analytical
results in the next section. Further, all forms of the transition rates that monotonously increase
with the frequency, indicated by the (pf) area, will not lead to cooperation. Social herding in
this case only amplifies defection.
0
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0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
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α2
(na)
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(pf)
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Figure 3: Fraction of cooperation (color scale) dependent on the nonlinearities in social herd-
ing, defined by α1, α2. Fixed level of social herding ζ=0.95. The four different areas are de-
fined in Fig. 1(left). • indicates the linear voter model. Szstem size N=400.
Assuming the right choice of parameters for the transition to cooperation, we can now take a
look how the dynamics evolve in space. We have chosen a two-dimensional regular lattice with
Von-Neumann neighborhood, where each agent interacts with n = 4 local neighbors. Initially,
we assume a small cluster of cooperating agents. Without social herding, this cluster would
immediately disappear in the next time step because all agents will choose defection, which is
12/22
F. Schweitzer, Pavlin Mavrodiev, C. J. Tessone:
How can social herding enhance cooperation?
Submitted (2012).
the rational choice to maximize their payoff. We observe instead a spreading of cooperation, i.e.
an invasion of the cooperating strategy into the domain of defectors. The cooperating agents,
however, do not form compact clusters. A minority fraction of defectors will always survive and
their spatial distribution in small clusters across the domain of cooperators continues to change
in time. I.e. we never reach a stationary state in space, despite that the global fraction of both
strategies, on average, reaches an equilibrium.
We further note that there is a critical size for the initial cluster of cooperators to grow. This has
been already discussed in detail for pure PD games on a regular lattice [8, 20], and in opinion
dynamics models [29]. Now, the addition of supercritical social herding of course reduces these
requirements. Is it worth mentioning that, starting from random initial conditions in a spatially
extended system, we find that a vanishingly small initial density of cooperators is enough to
trigger the final state. The reason for this stems from the fact that, if the system is large enough,
one cluster of cooperators larger than the critical size will appear by chance. This cluster will
be sufficient to trigger the outbreak of cooperation. Here, however, we will not dig further on
this discussion. Instead, the initial conditions and parameter constellations for the outbreak of
cooperation will be further discussed for the mean-field case, in the next section.
Figure 4: Snapshots of the transition toward cooperation at times t=0, 10, 20, 50, 150, 500.
N=104 agents are placed on a regular lattice and interact each with their n=4 spatial neigb-
hors. Dark color (blue) indicates cooperators, light color (yellow) defectors. Parameters
α1 = 0.25, α2 = 0.7, ζ = 0.95. System is a two-dimensional regular lattice with Von-Neumann
neighborhood and size N=400.
4 Mean-field investigations
4.1 Calculating the effort
We verified by means of computer simulations that there is indeed a way of utilizing social herding
to boost cooperation. Now, we try to illustrate this finding by some analytical considerations. As a
first step, we want to calculate the “effort” to transfer the system into a majority of cooperators.
Considering only the strategic dimension, this effort should be very high because there is a
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strong incentive to defect. On the other hand, social herding may help in this situation because
it neglects the payoff differences. So, it is particularly important in the first stage of the phase
transition.
A formal approach to calculate the effort starts from the master equation (16) on the systemic
level, in the mean-field limit. The detailed balance condition, which is a specific form of the
equilibrium condition dP (f, t)/dt = 0, requires that the net probability fluxes are balanced, i.e.
W (f |f − 1/N, ζ) P 0(f − 1/N, ζ) = W (f − 1/N |f, ζ) P 0(f, ζ), (19)
where P 0(f, ζ) denotes the equilibrium probability distribution which is independent of t. This
equation is recursive and, using f = N1/N , Eq. (2), can be re-formulated as:
P 0(f, ζ) = P 0(0, ζ)
N1∏
i=1
W
(
i
N
∣∣ i−1
N , ζ
)
W
(
i−1
N
∣∣ i
N , ζ
) . (20)
The normalization P 0(0, ζ) can be found by enforcing
∑N
i=0 P
0(i/N, ζ) = 1 and the transition
rates are given by Eq. (17). We visualize the equilibrium probability distribution by means of a
potential Ω(f, ζ) that has its minimum where P 0(f, ζ) has its maximum, i.e. it represents the
“effort” of reaching a given equilibrium state,
P 0(f, ζ) = exp{−Ω(f, ζ)}, (21)
where Ω is given by
Ω(f, ζ) = − lnP 0(0, ζ)−
N1∑
i=1
ln
[
W
(
i
N
∣∣ i−1
N , ζ
)
W
(
i−1
N
∣∣ i
N , ζ
)] (22)
Figure 2 shows the effort Ω(f, ζ) as a function of the global fraction of cooperators f and the level
of social herding ζ, which acts as a control parameter. We observe that for very low values of ζ the
effort is a monotonously increasing function of the frequency f . Given a fraction of cooperators,
f = 0.2, and small ζ, it becomes more and more difficult, or unlikely, to find a larger fraction of
cooperators (red line). Considering instead a high level of social herding, e.g ζ about 0.85. there
is a monotonous decrease of the effort with an increasing fraction of cooperators. I.e. starting
from a supercritical level of social herding, the outbreak and the increase of cooperation becomes
very likely (green line).
The observant reader will notice in Figure 5 for large ζ the nonmonotonous dependence of the
effort on the fraction of cooperators. I.e. there is a critical region around of f ≈ 0.2 below which
defection becomes the most probable state. This relates to the critical cluster size of cooperators
in Fig. 4 to allow the transition toward cooperation. However, there is a noticable difference
underlying both results. Fig. 5 is based on the mean-field limit, i.e. there is no spatial correlation
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Figure 5: Effort Ω(f, ζ), Eq. (22) dependent on the global fraction of cooperators f and the
level of social herding ζ. The nonlinearity is specified by α1=0.25, α2=0.85.
between interacting agents, whereas Fig. 4 assumes a spatial neigborhood defined by the regular
lattice. In fact, it is known that spatial interaction enhances cooperation [17, 20, 22]. Already
small, randomly formed clusters of cooperators are sufficient for the outbreak of cooperation,
whereas random interaction results in a much larger threshold.
4.2 Competition dynamics
Eventually, we can also derive a deterministic dynamics for the global fraction of cooperators,
f(t), in the mean-field limit. Basically, there are two ways of deriving this. One starts from the
stochastic dynamics on the microscopicl level, pi(θi, t), Eq. (14) and is discussed in detail in [18].
The other one starts from the stochastic dynamics on the macroscopic level, P (f, ζ, t) , Eq. (16).
The expected value for the global fraction of cooperators then follows from
〈f(ζ, t)〉 =
∑
f ′
P (f ′, ζ, t), (23)
where f ′ denote all possible realizations of f . Using the master equation (16), we arrive at the
deterministic dynamics
d 〈f(ζ, t)〉
dt
= W+(f, ζ) (1− 〈f〉)−W−(f, ζ) 〈f〉 , (24)
where the aggregated transition rates W+(f, ζ), W−(f, ζ) are given by Eq. (17). Assuming a
narrow probability distribution in equilibrium, P 0(f, ζ), the expected value
〈
f0(ζ)
〉
can be ap-
proximated by the maxima of P 0(f, ζ). In particular, the deterministic dynamics will converge to
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those areas where P 0(f, ζ) is largest, or where Ω(f, ζ) has its minima, shown in Fig. 5. While we
do not argue about the specific global dynamics at intermediate times (which can be governed by
stochastic influences in particular in early stages), we can see the late stage of the dynamics as a
“quasi-stationary” motion along the valley in the potential landscape shown in Fig. 5, provided
ζ chosen large enough.
We can rewrite Eq. (24) which basically describes the “replication” of cooperators at the global
scale, to make it more alike to the known replicator equation,
d 〈f(ζ, t)〉
dt
= 〈f〉 (1− 〈f〉)
[
E1(f, ζ)− E0(f, ζ)
]
. (25)
The two terms E1 and E0 are the fitness values associated with the two different strategies. The
fraction of cooperation will grow if the fitness of cooperation E1(f, ζ) is larger than the fitness of
defection E0(f, ζ), which both depend on the global level of cooperation and the level of social
herding,
E1(f, ζ) =
W+(f, ζ)
f
; E0(f, ζ) =
W−(f, ζ)
1− f . (26)
To evaluate the fitness values, one should note the stricly nonlinear depencence of the transion
rates on f , (17). Fig. 6 shows the difference E1−E0 on the whole range of f and ζ. We emphasize
that this graph holds for fixed values of the nonlinearity parameters α1, α2, i.e. it adds another
dimension to Fig. 3, which was obtained for a fixed herding level ζ. Fig. 6 also clearly shows
the influence of the initial fraction of cooperators, f(0), for the mean-field case. Assuming e.g.
a fixed value of ζ=0.85, we see that the fraction of cooperators f(t) can be increased in time
only if f(0) is between 0.15 and and 0.6. While the lower bound has an intuitive meaning as the
minimum threshold to start cooperation, the upper bound is less obvious. It results indeed from
the influence of the nonlinear social herding, which does not simply support cooperation if that
is the strategy of the majority. We recall that social herding does not assume any "value" related
to the strategies. Hence, for the example considered, the maximum fraction of cooperators is
given by f = 0.6. A higher level of social herding, or different values for the nonlinearities, may
increase this fraction up to about one, i.e. full cooperation.
Another way of expressing the dynamics of Eq. (25) is through
d 〈f(ζ, t)〉
dt
= 〈f(ζ, y)〉 (E1 − 〈E〉 ) ; 〈E〉 = ∑
σ
Eσ 〈fσ〉 = E1 〈f〉+ E0(1− 〈f〉). (27)
As long as E1 is larger than the average fitness, 〈E〉, the fraction of cooperators in the system
is able to grow, but one has to recognize that, because of the time dependence of 〈f(t)〉 and its
implicite feedback on Eσ, 〈E(t)〉 evolves over time as well. Hence, Eq. (27) describes a nonlinear
selection process for each of the strategies dependent on the parameters describing strategic
interaction and social herding.
16/22
F. Schweitzer, Pavlin Mavrodiev, C. J. Tessone:
How can social herding enhance cooperation?
Submitted (2012).
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
f
0.05
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.99
ζ
–
0
+0
Figure 6: Difference of the fitness values E1(f, ζ) − E0(f, ζ) dependent on the fraction of coop-
erators, f ∈ [0.02, 0.99], and the level of social herding, ζ ∈ [0.05, 0.99]. Nonlinearity parame-
ters: α1 = 0.25, α2 = 0.8.
For some special cases, we are able to derive closed form solutions of the competition dynamics
expressed by Eqs. (24)-(27). In the absense of any social herding, ζ=0, we just have to count in the
transition rates from strategic interaction, which are c˜k=0, d˜k=1. This results in E1(f, ζ=0) = 0
and E0(f, ζ=) = 1, i.e. the dynamics reads 〈f(t)〉 = f(0) exp{−t}, which means that cooperation
dies out, exponentially. In the opposite case, ζ = 1, i.e. absense of any strategic interaction,
Eq. (25) can be solved for the case of the linear voter model, which implies cˆk = k/4 and
dˆk = 1−(k/4), Eq. (11). We then findE1(f, ζ=1) = E0(f, ζ=1), i.e. the fitness of both strategies,
which are actually mere labels without any payoff assigned, is the same. This results in the
dynamics 〈f(t)〉 = f(0), i.e. a conservation of the initial fraction of cooperators, on average. This
is known as one of the puzzles associated with the linear voter model, i.e. individual realizations
of the dynamics, e.g. using stochastic simulations, always lead to convergence with f → 0 or
f → 1, but averaging over many runs reveals that the frequency at which cooperators or defectors
dominate is equal to their initial fraction f(0).
These two limiting cases allow us to position the dynamics if 0 < ζ < 1, i.e. the influence of both
strategic interaction and social herding at the same time. For social herding, let us first assume
the case of the linear voter model as described above. We can then verify that the closed solution
for the dynamics of cooperators is given as:
〈f(ζ, t)〉 = f(0) exp{(ζ−1)t} (28)
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which is similar to the case of only strategic interaction, except that the time scale for the
extinction of cooperators is stretched by the factor (1−ζ). This is an important result because it
demonstrates that linear social herding will not prevent the extinction of cooperation, not even
for large ζ. Hence, in order to turn defection into cooperation, we essentially need a high level of
nonlinear social herding, i.e. the right ζ and α2 values.
Considering a nonlinearity where α1 = 1/4 but α2 6= 2/4, we find from Eq. (24)
d 〈f(ζ, t)〉
dt
= 〈f〉
{
ζ
[
1 + 3 〈f〉 (1− 〈f〉)2 (2α2 − 1)
]
− 1
}
(29)
For α2 = 2/4, the solution reduces to Eq. (28), whereas for ζ = 1 we arrive at the mean-field
equation for the nonlinear voter model, only [18]. In order to make cooperation, 〈f〉 = 1, a stable
fixed point for the full dynamics, the following condition for α2 has to be met:
1
2
+
1− ζ
6ζ 〈f〉 (1− 〈f〉)2 < α2 ≤ 1 (30)
which implies 1/[1 + 3 〈f〉 (1−〈f〉)2] < ζ < 1. This inequality can be only met for a considerable
high level of social herding. The feasible range of (f, ζ) values that is consistent with a given
value of α2, e.g. α2=0.8, is shown in Fig. 6. The maximum range resulting from α2 = 1 is also
shown in the same Figure by the dashed line. We note again that, even if Eq. (30) is fulfilled,
the dynamics does not necessarily converge to f → 1. Dependent on the parameters {ζ, α1, α2}
also lower equilibrium fractions of cooperators may be reached, i.e. we find a coexistence of
coooperation and defection.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored a new route towards cooperation. This route differs from many
other attempts, most of which are rooted in traditional or evolutionary game theory, where
the transition toward cooperation is induced by specific neighborhood relations, repeated in-
teractions, discounted payoffs over long time horizons, indirect reciprocity, favorable strategy
mutations, the enforcement of social norms, etc [9, 19, 26–28] All of these propositions either
improve the payoff of the cooperating strategy or provide, in one or another way, additional
information agents may consider when making a strategic decision.
Our approach is much simpler, by not changing payoffs at all, but only counting on the informa-
tion agents alredy have if they simultaneously play a 2-Person PD game with their n neighbors
(which can be spatial neighbors, or randomly chosen). This information is the local fraction of
cooperators, fi = n1/n, and defectors, (1−fi), of an agent, that also enters the calculation of the
payoff, Eq. (4). That means there is no additional information assumed. We argue instead that
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agents, at the same time, respond to this information in two different ways, as summarized in
Eq. (9). In a strategic interaction, they choose the strategy θi that will lead to the highest payoff
ai(θi, fi), whereas in the case of social herding they simply respond to the local frequency of each
strategy in a nonlinear manner, F(fθi). In some sense, the second way assumes less information
because no payoff matrix needs to be known. This implies that both strategies are seen as equally
valuable.
The parameter ζi gives a weight to these two different ways of utilizing the information associated
with fi. In Eq. (9) we have assumed ζi to be an individual parameter, which means that agents
dependent on their internal preferences or access to knowledge (such as a known payoff) can give
different weights to these two responses. In this paper, however, we did not further explore this
source of heterogeneity, but kept it as a global parameter, constant and the same for all agents.
This limit case is equivalent of assuming a population of agents, a fraction ζ of which only follows
social herding, whereas a fraction (1 − ζ) only considers strategic interactions. This allows to
interpret our main result about a critical ζ to turn a population of defectors into cooperators
in a more general manner: ζ can be seen as the minimal fraction of agents following only social
herding, to enable the transition to cooperation. With respect to the access to information, we
can interpret this finding as follows: if the information about the payoff matrix is know to all
agents, they will –in the given Prisoner’s Dilemma setting– collectively choose defection (which
is the suboptimal state). However, if only a small fraction of agents (about 20%) (see Fig. 2)
has information about the payoff matrix and the majority will just respond to the decision of
others by means of nonlinear social herding, this can drive the system towards a state where
cooperation is the dominant strategy. To put it succinctly: less information (or a larger fraction
of uninformed agents) will lead to more cooperation.
This interesting and important conclusion still relies on choosing the right nonlinear social herding
in response to the local (or global) fraction of cooperators. We have demonstrated that the linear
response, where the probability to choose a strategy is directly proportional to the fraction of
that strategy in the neighborhood (or the population), fails to enhance cooperation. Instead, we
have to choose a nonlinearity, expressed in terms of the parameters α1, α2, from the region of
positive allee (pa) effects (Fig. 2). As a minimal condition for the transition towards cooperation,
all transition rates can be (but not necessarily have to be) chosen according to the linear voter
model, except α2, which has to be above the critical value 0.5 to break the tie in case of an equal
fraction of cooperators and defectors. Further, the combination of ζ and α2 also determines the
maximum level of cooperation that can be reached using the two different responses.
Our finding tells that social herding matters most in tie situations, which is also similar to
another class of group decision models [6]. To design a mechanism that influences social herding
only in this situation also provides a quite “cost-efficient” solution in that we will not need to
enforce a decision against the majority, to allow for the transition toward cooperation. Agents
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can still follow the strategy of the majority –just in the undecided case, we need to ensure that
the symmetry is broken into the “right” direction.
Eventually, we wish to point out that in this paper we have discussed a kind of worst-case scenario
where, in the absense of social herding, defection is the only stable state for the system. Even
for this case, our proposed mechanism excels in transferring defectors into cooperators, on the
population level. We can leverage other model ingredients to further facilitate this transition.
For example, we could count in stochastic changes of the strategy as already considered in the
strategic component G(ai), Eq. (5), which would support random cooperation. We can further
allow for repeated interaction or “the shadow of the future” which are already known to foster
cooperation [2, 3, 31]. The important message here is that, even under worst conditions there
is a way to reach cooperation in a game-theoretical setting by means of social herding, i.e. by
pure social influence. Including this additional dimension into strategic interaction avoids the
lock-in into pure defection, which is the suboptimal state compared to pure cooperation. The
mechanism we have proposed here does not rely on additional information, in fact it uses less
of the available information, in particular no information about the payoff structure and no
comparison of alternative strategies. Further, we emphasize again the “cost efficiency” of the
mechanism proposed in that it does not enforce decisions agains the majority, but influences the
decisions of agents only in tie situations.
Summing up, adding social herding to strategic interactions is a way to substantially increase
the level of cooperation with less, not more: simple rules instead of far-reaching regulations to
enforce cooperation, no additional information as assumed e.g. in success driven mechanisms, no
additional costs as in other incentive schemes. Just social herding, the right (nonlinear) way.
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